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Abstract
Several countries have taken steps to protect copyright data, some using judicial 
means and others implementing protection systems. Some Hydrographic Offices 
(HOs) feel that ENCs in particular, need to be protected from piracy and/or deliber­
ate tampering. These issues are not unique to ENC (Electronic Navigational Chart) 
distribution but form a basic part of e-commerce infrastructure. A modern public key 
infrastructure system addresses the needs of data authentication, data security and 
non-repudiation. There are both technology and policy issues when one considers a 
protection system. The implementation of a tight security system along the entire 
distribution chain is necessary to make the system effective. Despite modern 
advances in encryption technology, there are some major impediments to achieving 
the goals of a security system. The complexities of key management and the accept­
ance of the user community are two of these. There is also the ethical issue of deny­
ing a ship access to ENCs once the license period has ended. The ship may have 
no other chart information on board. PRIMAR's Security System is currently gather­
ing important operational experience in operating a protection system.
Introduction
In Canada recently a person was charged, found guilty and sentenced to a 6- 
month jail term for unlawfully reproducing copyrighted chart data. It represented 
the first time in Canada that the federal government had taken such steps to pro­
tect copyright data1. Several other countries, most notably Australia, have been 
pursuing violations of copyright to various degrees of success. Clearly, many coun­
tries take this issue very seriously. It is therefore not a surprise that some of 
these countries would be interested in pursuing various non-judicial means to pre­
vent or, at least make more difficult, such acts of data piracy.
There are both legal liability and revenue protection reasons for protecting official 
data. Some Hydrographic Offices (HOs) feel that ENCs in particular need to be pro­
tected from piracy and/or deliberate tampering. Furthermore, some HO’s have 
been advised that it would only be prudent to implement some measure of assur­
ance that the data was protected against tampering somewhere along the distri­
bution chain. Some level of assurance should be provided to the end user that the 
data file about to be used is, in fact, a legitimate and approved product of the 
issuing HO. And to fully close the loop some would like the confirmation back to 
the HO or its agent that in fact this has taken place.
These issues are not unique but form a basic part of e-commerce infrastructure.
A modern Public Key Infrastructure system (PKI) addresses the needs of data authentication, data secu­
rity and non-repudiation. This is beneficial in the sense that it is a shared problem. It is also constraining 
in that the technology is emerging and the field competitive and fast moving2.
For more than a decade the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) has taken a leadership position 
in efforts to facilitate the introduction of Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) tech­
nology. Among other objectives, the IHO aims to provide a well-coordinated approach to the delivery of 
Electronic Navigational Charts (ENCs) as is practical3.
Such coordination clearly extends to the ways and means for data security against tampering or piracy. 
There is a well-founded concern that the introduction of widely different security schemes will act as a 
setback to the introduction of ECDIS. Nevertheless, there is no existing standard for such a system nor 
do the existing S-52 or S-57 standards mention such functionality. The IHOs Committee on Hydrographic 
Requirements for Information Systems (CHRIS) established an Encryption Project Group (EPG) to investi­
gate the surrounding issues4. The author chairs that group.
The world’s shipowners seemed poised to invest in ECDIS but will only do so if they see adequate ENC 
coverage and a well-coordinated distribution infrastructure available. Viewed from an end-user perspec­
tive, unless a protection system is relatively transparent, user friendly and implemented in a well-coordi­
nated way, it might prove to be a serious setback to the global acceptance of ECDIS.
Protection System Issues
There are both technology and policy issues when one considers a protection system. Both are driven by 
the underlying need for some form of security.
Why A Security System?
For HOs and their agents, there are several motivations for implementing a security or protection system.
1. Protection against non-deliberate virus or other unintentional corruption of the data
2. Demonstration to the end-user of the legitimacy and integrity of the data
3. Demonstration of the ownership of the data and implied or explicit copyright protection
4. Protection against deliberate corruption or manipulation of data
5. Protection against data piracy
6. Access control
It is the piracy issue that most people think of when they consider a security system. The protection of copy­
right data from acts of data piracy is a concern for those whose existence is dependent upon some form of 
cost recovery. To protect an investment or one’s assets is a fundamental part of a good business strategy. 
A punitive approach, where the full extent of the law is brought to bear on the problem, is one method. The 
implementation of a tight security system along the entire distribution chain is another.
Protection against deliberate tampering of the data (or, at least the notification of such tampering) would be 
a step forward in risk avoidance and a prudent act to  take. Knowledge that one is using the officially 
approved product and not some uncontrolled imitation gives the end user some degree of assurance. 
Access control is a method that allows the most efficient methods of data distribution to be carried out with­
out penalty to either the client or the distributor. In essence it allows for a catalogue of data products to be 
mass produced and distributed on, for example, CD-ROM and yet allow access to only those files that have 
been licensed and paid for.
To the six objectives above, one could add the following three implementation directives:
- Implementation simplicity 
End-user simplicity
- Speed of implementation
The system must be relatively easy to implement particularly if it is to be a global standard. The end user must 
be able to access files in a straightforward and logical manner. Finally, the protections system cannot add an 
unbearable computational load on the system thereby inhibiting its main functionality as a navigation device.
In a perfect world a security system scheme would be practically unbreakable, yet its effect on the end- 
user totally transparent. The latter is an important issue since all security systems schemes put some
burden on the end user. The limits to what mariners are willing to put up with will dictate the true level of 
security attained. A largely unbreakable scheme is possible but only when the mariner and everyone else 
in the distribution chain co-operate and agree to some rigid protocols. We cannot always expect this to 
happen and so some compromises must be made to find the right level of security. As a general princi­
ple one requires a scheme that costs as much to break as to legitimately purchase the data and is trans­
parent enough for traditional clients to accept.
To complicate matters some nations have export restrictions on encryption technology and what is a per­
missible level of encryption in one country is considered a violation in others.
The Building Blocks of a Security System
Encryption is not a new technology. The first use of encryption dates back thousands of years5. Over time, the 
technology has changed as the encrypters try and stay one step ahead of the codebreakers6.
Historically the purposes of encryption have largely been for military or political reasons although in the latter 
part of the 20th century it has found a commercial home. Most recently, the state of the art in encryption tech­
nology available to the general public is considered a national security problem in some countries. Largely 
unbreakable codes for example can prevent police from carrying out legal investigative search techniques or 
can allow foreign states to access security technology that can be used against the nations that have devel­
oped them. Some countries have taken steps to prevent this although there has been some recent relaxation 
in this area7. Data Authentication fulfills a narrower objective, namely verification that the data set has 
arrived in the same state that it was released by the HO. Authentication therefore satisfies the first 4 
objectives of security but not necessarily the protection against piracy8.
How Encryption Works
Encryption takes place when a secret key is used in an algorithm to change a digital file (text or data) into what 
appears to be meaningless code. Access to that secret key and the corresponding decryption algorithm will return 
the file into its original form. Access to that secret key is crucial for decryption. This remains the essence of cryp­
tography today as its has for hundreds of years. Protection of the secret key is the core of the security system. 
Codebreaking without the key (known as cryptoanalysis) is possible in theory but is very difficult. Today’s 
computers owe their design to a gifted group of mathematicians who built the first digital computers to 
break codes during World War II. This form of codebreaking is still possible but requires substantial com­
puter resources. The ability to break code is dependent upon the length of the secret key. The longer the 
key length the longer the time to solve the code. Using the strongest key length encryption available today 
would take all of the worlds computers many years to solve. Weaker key length encryption might take 
weeks on standard desktop PC to crack9.
Using the same key to encrypt as to decrypt is known as symmetric encryption. Most encryption takes 
place this way and the process is very fast. The down side of symmetric encryption is the problem of 
transferring the secret key to those who need it and keeping it away from those who do not.
Public Key Encryption
One of the biggest revolutions in cryptography is the invention of asymmetric encryption -  that is, the use of 
one key to encrypt and another to decrypt. The advantage is that one can use a so-called Public Key to encrypt 
and another Private Key to decrypt. The Public Key can be made available to anyone, hence the name. For exam­
ple, one can post it on a web site. Anyone wanting to send you encrypted data would simply use your Public 
Key to encrypt the file and then send it to you10. Only those with access to the Private Key can decrypt the data. 
Asymmetric encryption is generally slower than symmetric but the two forms are used extensively in tandem. 
Public key encryption is largely used to transmit the secret keys used in symmetric encryption. In practice 
security systems use and transmit many secret keys over insecure channels. PKI allows these transfers to 
take place in a secure manner. The problem of delivering the Private Key remains but this is a one-time trans­
action11. Once established, the system can them be used to transmit an unlimited number of secret keys. 
The technical heart of asymmetric encryption is based on Number Theory. In general, it relies on the fact 
that it is technically difficult to factor very large numbers. Two very large prime numbers (several hundred 
digits each) when multiplied together form a large number that is very difficult to factor into its primitives.
It is this degree of computational difficulty which makes a security system work. The Public and Private 
keys are derived from the combination of the two large primes.
Digital Signatures
Data Authentication occurs as follows: the file to be sent is passed through a mathematical function 
known as a hash function which gives a unique outcome for the file called a hash code. This hash code 
is then encrypted with the sender's Private Key and attached to the file. This attached code is known as 
a digital signature. The person receiving the file can then verify that the file was sent legitimately by 
decrypting the digital signature using the sender's Public Key, to get the hash code. The file is also 
passed through the same hash function to get a second hash code. The two hash codes are compared 
and, if the same, authenticating the file and assuring it was not altered en route.
Impediments to Achieving the Goals of A Security System
Given the difficulty of breaking the security code through cryptoanalysis implementing a secure protec­
tions system should be straightforward. In fact, there are some major impediments to achieving the goals 
of a security system. These can be categorised as follows:
Weaknesses in the end-to-end protection system 
Lack of a standardised encryption methodology 
Type approval limitations
International Maritime Organization (IMO) concurrence 
Complexity of global Key Management 
Lack of acceptance by end users 
Weaknesses in the End-to-end Protection System
Encryption is frequently seen as a complete security solution. In reality, it is only part. Data that is 
encrypted can be compromised by a number or non-cryptoanalytic attacks. For example, you do not need 
to break the code to read an encrypted message. You can watch over the shoulder of the person doing 
the encoding, steal decryption keys, bribe someone to access the files, etc. Physical and other forms of 
electronic security are still necessary. Often the weakest encryption methodology is the strongest link in 
an overall end-to-end protection system as the more obvious loopholes are ignored.
One of the most obvious security holes in ENC protection is the paper chart. It contains the intellectual 
property of the ENC and is a product freely available to the public. Anyone willing to make the investment 
and run the risk of copyright violation can create the S-57 equivalent. Depending upon where this is done 
it can be an inexpensive option.
There are many points of weakness in the ENC production and distribution chain. The ethically challenged have 
many options. One can use collusion, bribery and threats to gain access to the data. Physical access to the 
location of the ENC distribution center, the HO where the ENCs have been created or quality assured or the con­
tractors where the work was initially done will almost certainly guarantee access to the unencrypted ENCs. The 
same holds for the locations where off-site back-up tapes are stored. Likewise, for Regional ENC Coordinating 
Centres (RENCs) and any dealers, agents or system manufactures that distributes the data. The data is trust­
ed to software systems that could easily make copies of unencrypted ENCs as they process them. Anyone who
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has access to an ECDIS, such as systems suppliers, service people and, of course, clients also have unique 
opportunities to access the unencrypted ENC. In the end, an ECDIS will have to be able to display the ENCs, 
independent of whether the data was at some point encrypted. At that point the security is vulnerable. 
Techniques such as Attack Tree Analysis help highlight such security weaknesses12.
Lack of a Standardised Encryption Methodology
There is great value in having only one standard method for encryption so that users are not saddled with 
a variety of decryption schemes to master13.
Type Approval
To date several ECDIS have been type approved and many are in the queue for certification. A post type-approval 
add-on security system that incorporates decryption would require sufficient changes to the ECDIS software to 
void the certification. Hence, any type-approved systems that implement decryption would have to undergo re­
certification. The degree of re-testing would be restricted to those features considered at risk.
IMO Politics
The widespread acceptance of ECDIS in the marine community is dependent upon the continued support 
of the IMO. As encryption was not a feature of S-52 (and its addition could not be considered a minor 
deviation from the original intent of the specifications) the IMO might pose a political problem if some 
nations decide to make it an issue.
Complexity of Global Key Management
A pivotal issue whenever encryption is involved is Key Management. Access Control involves a separate 
key for each file and the keys are uniquely linked to a specific ECDIS through a hardware key such as a 
dongle. Ships with more than one system (such as a second system for back-up) therefore need separate 
keys for each. The management of these keys and their administrative requirements (such as license 
renewal dates) must be managed in a way that is not a burden on the end user.
Lack of Acceptance by End Users
The user community for ENCs has a limited tolerance for user-unfriendly features. This has been amply 
demonstrated through the various sea trials conducted around the world. Professional mariners want 
tools that are immediately helpful and provide unambiguous useful information in a timely manner. Tools 
must be well designed and ergonomically structured to assist the mariner in conducting incident-free voy­
ages. If the security system is complex for the user to understand and administratively difficult to man­
age one can expect a strong resistance to acceptance.
General Options for Implementing A Security System
There are a number of options in considering a security system and each approach has its advantages 
and disadvantages.
Do Nothing
Doing nothing is always an option. In fact, that is what a number of HOs are doing now. Protection is 
assumed to follow from signed license agreements and the HOs willingness to litigate against pirates. 
Shift the Burden
HO’s can avoid the encryption issue by shifting the security burden to system manufacturers. In that case, 
each manufacturer could design a system-specific scheme around their System Electronic Navigational 
Chart (SENC). The onus would be placed on the manufacturer to provide proof of security and they could 
be made liable for piracy of data for systems that did not meet security performance specifications. The 
chief advantage is that there is no need for a universally acceptable method for encryption. A disadvan­
tage is that users must be able to acquire their SENCs anywhere in the world, an additional burden on a 
systems manufacturer with a limited distribution chain. Internet-based distribution might alleviate this 
problem. A second disadvantage might be that users, tied to one data supplier, feel they were not bene­
fiting from a more open and competitive environment.
Watermark the Data
Watermarking the data demonstrates that HO’s or RENCs are building in a tracing mechanism by which 
pirates can be successfully prosecuted for copyright violation14.
Encrypt the Data
Block file encryption is straightforward and does not require changes to the existing S-57 standard. By 
definition encrypted data files are not S-57 compliant until they are decrypted. As an example, the UK has 
several years of experience with its encryption scheme for ARCS product as has C-Map and others. PRI- 
MAR have implemented a protection system for the distribution of their ENCs. The disadvantage is that 
there is presently no agreed upon standard encryption process to implement.
Add Encryption to S57
Encrypting layers or individual objects, on the other hand, is much more flexible. Using this methodology, 
decisions could be made about what to encrypt and what not to encrypt. For example, navigation-critical 
information, information that would be necessary to avoid maritime incidents, could be left unencrypted, 
while less critical information could be encrypted, so that only those who paid for the service could access 
them. The disadvantage with this method is that it would require an overhaul of the existing S-57 standard. 
And it would certainly add complexity to S-57. Given the desire by HO’s to freeze the format until a signifi­
cant critical mass of ENCs has been created means this approach is unworkable in the short run. Secondly, 
it would be difficult to judge what is navigation-critical and what is not. These are serious limitations.
Some Ethical Dilemmas
Data Security vs. Navigation Safety 
The Ethical Issue
Consider the following scenario: due to an on-board emergency a ship suddenly has to divert to a port or to a 
safe haven to wait out a storm. The Captain presumes the appropriate charts are available since they were 
used a year earlier. The ECDIS however cannot access the ENCs since the license period has expired. The ship, 
which now no longer carries paper charts, must proceed without any charts, runs aground and sinks. The eth­
ical issue is a simple one: can a HO or its Agent deny access to an ENC that is available, albeit in encrypted 
form? It is ironic that agencies whose mandate is to provide information to enable safe navigation end up deny­
ing access to this information - even when they have a legitimate business reason for doing so.
The Legal Issue
If not ethically, is there a legal liability issue if encryption denies access? One could presume that as long 
as a substantial effort had been made to contact the licensee about license renewal, the court might like­
ly find that the licensee had sufficient time available to renew a license and knowingly decided against 
renewal. Having a substantial warning period and a follow-up grace period would be prudent.
License Periods, Warning Periods & Grace Periods
Encryption means privileged access and in a licensing environment it means privileged access for predeter­
mined intervals. The situation can be summarised in the following graphic. Towards the end of the standard 
license period, the users are warned of the expiry date. The warnings can be delivered in a variety of ways but 
are designed to remind users of the approaching end date of the license. This is referred to as the Warning 
Period. For example a period of two months prior to the expiry date, warning messages are given or a window 
on the display shows the end date or days-to-go. At the end of the Warning Period is E-Day for expiry day. This 
marks the beginning of the Grace Period. The Grace Period allows a level of service lower than the standard 
level and runs for a period yet to be determined. At the end of the Grace Period is the T-Day for Termination 
Day. After this date, the data is unavailable until action is taken to renew the license.15
Immediate Options Available for A Security System
Should a HO or RENC decide to implement a security system in the near future there are two main options: 
adopt an existing encryption approach or have the data distributed through Agents in the SENC form. 
Option 1: The PRIMAR Model 
How It Works
The core technology of the PRIMAR encryption scheme is based on Public/Private key infrastructure. The
License Period Out of License Period
Standard Warning Period E Grace Period T
Table 1: The warning and grace periods
encryption/decryption engine uses the BLOWFISH algorithm. This is a well-known approach and provides 
medium scale security. It is similar to that used in many commercial implementations16.
The implementation of the UK algorithm mentioned previously was undertaken by PRIMAR and success­
fully integrated into their management information systems. Engineering kits were developed and provid­
ed to manufacturers who wished to implement the decryption process into their ECDIS17.
How It Can Be Implemented
PRIMAR has provided information of the basic structure of the encryption and authentication implemen­
tation. The security modules do not exist as a stand-alone system and cannot be implemented in a ‘plug- 
and-play’ mode but require integration into the file management and business operations of each RENC. 
Notable Advantages
The security system has been designed and implemented by a leader in the industry and other RENCs 
can benefit from their knowledge. The protection system itself provides modern encryption and authenti­
cation technology.
Notable Cautions
Key Management requires a substantial effort. Implementing a foolproof method for keeping the system 
simple for the clients will require extensive planning and testing prior to a full rollout of a global security 
system. Since the PRIMAR model is not "plug-and-play" other RENCs will have to budget resources care­
fully for this task. The cost of maintaining the security system will have an impact on ENC pricing.
Option 2: SENC Distribution 
How It Works
In the SENC model, the burden of security is placed on the supply chain. System manufacturers play a 
central role since the encryption and authentication functions are implemented at the SENC stage, not 
the ENC. Manufacturers and agents are free to choose whatever form of security system they wish, pro­
viding it meets some predetermined performance specifications which HOs and RENCs can set.
How It Can Be Implemented
The implementation details are left to the manufacturers and/or agents.
Notable Advantages
The HO’s and RENCs are spared the task of implementing a security system leaving more resources for 
base operations, ENC production and Quality Assurance.
Notable Cautions
The distribution of ENCs in the SENC form is not considered a legitimate ECDIS implementation accord­
ing to the existing S-52 standard. The standard states that the ENC must be converted by the ECDIS on 
board the ship. Additionally, HOs or RENCs are dependent upon the manufacturers and/or agents to pro­
vide the appropriate level of security. Clients might be tied to one source for their data.
Current Status
Encryption is a complex issue with many conflicting requirements. It is not an endeavor to step into light­
ly. Prior to making the decision to implement a system a thorough threat analysis must be done to iso­
late the major areas of concern. Attack Tree Analysis is a good technique to follow to isolate the major 
threat areas. Next one must complete a benefit cost analysis; the cost of protection must be far less than 
the expected loss of revenue. Additionally, non-technical protection methods such as litigation exist for 
copyright protection and these should be considered as potential solutions.
PRIMAR's security systems approach is technically sound but does not achieve all security objectives. It is 
unlikely that any system would. PRIMAR’s model is ‘portable’ but not ‘plug-and-play’ and this might hamper its
easy installation elsewhere. It is the implementation of the system, not the encryption itself, that is the tech­
nical challenge. Nevertheless, PRIMAR is establishing valuable experience in maintaining the system.
The SENC approach to ENC distribution is viable but does not fit into the existing standards framework. 
The S-52 standard could and should be changed as several parts are out of date and no longer valid.
A Universal Framework for an ENC Security System
Given the rapid pace of change in the world of e-commerce it may be premature to establish a global stan­
dard for an ENC protection system. Nonetheless, such a system should have the following characteristics18:
1. the candidate solutions must be based on an established international standard
2. use an algorithm in the public domain
3. offer maximum transparency to the end user
4. be comparatively easy to implement and manage
5. not break any nation’s export restrictions
6. not be tied to one specific business model
Consideration 1) is evolving rapidly with a big push from federal agencies looking to push e-government 
and from e-commerce;
Consideration 2) is straightforward and do-able right now;
Considerations 3), 4) and 6) are implementation issues; and
Consideration 5) is becoming easier to solve and perhaps is now off the table19.
The world of e-commerce is rapidly advancing and fast changing. The US has a plan to develop a new 
encryption standard called Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The algorithms are open, source code 
available and carry no copyright. This selection process represents one of the leading efforts to estab­
lish a standard algorithm. Many countries are likely to adopt this approach once it is established20. 
Despite all this technology, before anyone actually considers implementing any protection system it is pru­
dent to ask the simple questions: Why should I implement a protection system? What am I trying to pre­
vent? How great is that risk? Will the system accomplish that protection? What level of security do I real­
ly need? It is only after answering those questions that an appropriate level of security can be imple­
mented. As in all major endeavors, decision through informed choice is still the best approach.
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